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Abstract—With the current trend of embedding location ser-
vices within social networks, an ever growing amount of users’
spatiotemporal tracks are being collected and used to generate
user proﬁles. Issues of personal privacy and especially those
stemming from tracking user location become more important to
address. In this work, it is argued that support of location privacy
awareness within social networks is needed to maintain the
users’ trust in their services. Current practices of pre-conﬁguring
location disclosure settings have been shown to be limited, where
users’ sense of location privacy dynamically change with context.
In this paper, location privacy awareness is considered within a
composite view of place, time and social data recorded in user
proﬁles. The paper examines the possible threats to personal
privacy from exposure of this data and the design of feedback
tools to allow users to control their privacy. A user study is used to
examine the impact of the feedback provided on users’ perception
of privacy and the link between their privacy concerns and their
attitude towards using the geo-social network. Findings conﬁrm
the strong need for more transparent access to and control over
user location proﬁles, and guide the proposal of recommendations
to the design of more privacy-sensitive geo-social networks.
Keywords—Location privacy; Privacy awareness; Geo-social
networks; Usable privacy
I. INTRODUCTION
Users are concerned about online privacy. This is a fact
that has now been tested many times in recent years [1], [2].
Our interactions on the web and on social media are used for
making predictive inferences about our personality and what
we might want to buy, read, or listen to1. Our whereabouts
is another layer of information that is now being carefully
captured and added to our records. We are ”switching on”
location on our devices to tell our friends where we are and
to search for the nearest good restaurant, but are we paying
the price with our privacy? The importance of sharing our
location data online is that it pulls together our virtual and
physical existences, and thus raises critical questions about
privacy in both worlds.
People trust the social networks services they use [3], they
mostly do not read terms and conditions (and privacy policies)
[4], and ﬁnd privacy settings increasingly difﬁcult to manage
[5]. With the continuous stream of privacy-intrusion alerts,
and the reality of current demands of surveillance of online
information2, people will eventually come to question their
trust in social networking services, and may tend to be more
1www.eff.org/deeplinks/2009/09/online-trackers-and-social-networks
2www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/17/mass-surveillance-social-media-
permitted-uk-law-charles-farr
rigorous and stringent with their online sharing behaviour.
However, this trend may be reversed if individuals were able
to recognise the information recorded in their online proﬁles
and were given opportunities to control that information and
its visibility.
In this paper we focus on user content awareness and in
particular location content awareness in relation to privacy on
Geo-Social Networks (GeoSNs)- online social networks with
location-sharing facilities. The map of locations in a user’s
proﬁle can be used as a key to deﬁne and relate other types of
data elements, for example, their interests and activities can be
related to the places they visit. Along with temporal semantics,
the proﬁle can provide a rich resource of personal and possibly
sensitive information. The paper examines the dimensions of
location data sharing on GeoSNs and how user awareness is
situated in this information space. Levels of threat to privacy
are proposed as means of assigning value to the information
in this space. To enable location content awareness, design of
feedback tools is considered that captures user’s attention to
both the content they are sharing and to the associated risks.
A user study, in the form of an online survey, is carried out
to test the implications of location content awareness on user
privacy concerns as well as on user’s attitude and behaviour
on geo-social networks. Results generally conﬁrm initial as-
sumptions with respect to the limitations of users’ awareness
and their need for more transparent access to their proﬁle
content. In addition, it was also clear that users need actionable
feedback that allows them to control their content. Results
also suggest, that transparency of content and the opportunity
of control over the content may neutralise the adverse effects
of privacy concerns and lead to more trust in the geo-social
networking services. These ﬁndings are useful for designing
more effective privacy-sensitive geo-social networks.
Few previous studies addressed location awareness and
privacy concerns [6], and these were mainly questioning users’
attitude with respect to sharing their current location informa-
tion. These studies neglected revealing the privacy implica-
tions in terms of what personal information can be extracted
based on location disclosure using limited location-sharing
applications for their evaluations, which can be insufﬁcient for
reﬂecting the public GeoSNs features. This paper contributes
a more detailed study that considers awareness with respect to
extended user proﬁles on the space, time and social dimensions
and provides an understanding of how users’ perception of
their location content inﬂuences their privacy concerns and
2016 10th International Conference on Next Generation Mobile Applications, Security and Technologies
978-1-5090-0949-7/16 $31.00 © 2016 IEEE
DOI 10.1109/NGMAST.2016.26
1052161-2897/16 $31.00 © 2016 IEEE
behaviour on GeoSNs. To the best of our knowledge, this is
the ﬁrst study to address location privacy in public GeoSNs
through content awareness approach.
II. RELATED WORK
Our work is related to two lines of research; methods for
location-based inferences from mobility data sets to examine
the potential sort of information user proﬁle on GeoSNs, and
the design of feedback to enable privacy awareness on these
networks.
A. Location-Based Inference in GeoSNs
A signiﬁcant interest can be witnessed in research studying
the value and utility of location information on GeoSNs
to understand users’ behaviour. Some studies looked into
accurate identiﬁcation of user’s location from their GPS trails
[7], as well as using the location of the user’s friends on
Twitter [8]. Using the user’s proﬁle of visited places and socio-
historical ties, Gao et al. demonstrated an accurate prediction
of next check-in information [9].
Other works investigated the potential inference of social
relationships between users of GeoSNs. For instance, co-
occurrence between users, extracted from geo-tagged Flickr
pictures, was sufﬁcient for deducing their social ties with high
probability [10]. In addition, users’ interactions on the network
coupled with their location information were used to predict
friendship links [8].
Extracting spatiotemporal movement and activity patterns
of users on GeoSNs attracted much research in recent years.
Dearman et al. exploited location reviews on Yelp in order
to identify a collection of potential activities promoted by
the reviewed location [11]. Mobility patterns on Foursquare
was the subject of study in [12], by considering popular
places and transitions between place categories, and in [13],
where displacement between consecutive check-ins and return-
ing probability to venues were computed. More recently, a
study showed that location information can be used to reveal
personal details of users, with minimal amounts of check-in
information [14].
The above sample of studies demonstrate the variety and
amount of information that can be derived from user loca-
tion information on GeoSNs, and consequently the need for
examining threats to user privacy on these networks.
B. Privacy Feedback and Notiﬁcations
Feedback and notiﬁcations tools are commonly used for
warning users about security and privacy risks on the web.
Studies are emerging to assess user awareness of privacy
implications and the impact of such tools on the user attitude
while interacting with systems [15].
Visualisation of privacy warnings was found to be effective
in increasing user awareness of privacy threats, as demon-
strated in [16], while users were more able to access their
information and to manage it effectively, if provided with a
view of how their proﬁle appeared to other people [17].
The extent of users’ awareness and its impact on their
attitude and privacy concerns was the subject of many stud-
ies. Rader observed the links between limited awareness of
possible privacy violations and the usefulness of policy-based
privacy solutions [2], while other studies noted that increased
awareness encourages users to utilise stricter accessibility
options [18]. Similarly, Sadeh et al. found that methods that
raise users’ awareness about the way their data is used tend
to stimulate users to produce more accurate preferences and
increase the users’ trust in the application [19].Tsai et al.
developed a mobile location-sharing application to investigate
how informing users of who can access their location might
inﬂuence their privacy concerns and attitude [20]. Their ﬁnd-
ings show that informed users were more comfortable with
sharing their location and had less privacy concerns. Recently,
Patil et al. observed that immediate feedback about location
disclosures without any ability to control the disclosures,
evoked feelings of oversharing and recommended the use
of proactive techniques for adjusting recommendations to
disclosure settings especially in the case of socially distant
users and visiting atypical locations [6].
Usability of privacy notices and feedback tools is of rel-
evance to this work. The complexity of privacy polices and
settings and the need for more accessible tools motivated much
research in this area [5]. Of interest are studies into users’
perception of privacy risk, where visual cues were shows to
be useful [21], particularly when shown in-context [22].
The above studies generally assume that awareness of
location information is conﬁned to the visits the user make
to places, but do not consider a holistic view of possible
inferences that may be made in the network, as described in
section II-A above. This paper attempts to ﬁll this gap, by
utilising both lines of research in studying user awareness in
GeoSNs.
III. MODELLING USER CONTENT AWARENESS ON
GEO-SOCIAL NETWORKS
In this section, we examine the question of whether a user
is aware of the information they are sharing on geo-scoial
networks. To answer this question, we begin by considering
the dimensions of location data, its properties and relationships
that can be used to build a user proﬁle (geo-proﬁle) on
these networks, and use this information space to analyse
user awareness. We then propose a model of privacy threat
levels that is related to the content implicit in the shared data,
and ﬁnally suggest that design of feedback tools for location
content awareness needs to project both relevant content and
associated threat levels.
A. Dimensions of a User Geo-Proﬁle
On GeoSNs, users intentionally declare their presence in
a particular place at a particular time. In some applications,
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for example, Google and Foursquare, users are able to grant
permission for continuous background collection of their spa-
tiotemporal tracks (by ”switching on location” on devices).
In this section, we examine the dimensions of the data being
collected in such systems and the types of information that
can be inferred to construct geo-proﬁles for users.
Three primary dimensions to user information on geo-social
networks can be identiﬁed; 1. the spatial dimension, 2. the
social dimension, and 3. the temporal dimension.
The spatial dimension refers to the geographic locations
associated with the user. A spatiotemporal (ST) track is com-
posed of a sequence of time-stamped geographic coordinates
representing the user’s movement in geographic space over
time. The coordinates may refer directly to speciﬁc identiﬁable
places, when users explicitly deﬁne the place they visit, or a
process of reverse geocoding can be used to infer the possible
place identity from the point coordinates. Increasingly, geo-
graphic gazetteers are shared between applications to aid this
process, for instance, Instagram allows users to geotag their
pictures using the Foursquare API and Facebook Places3 and
Twitter uses the Google API for linking users’ selected place
name with a location on a map.
Given the place identiﬁers on a ST track, other useful place
properties can be extracted, for example, the type of the place,
e.g. a school or a hospital, and the types of services (or human
activities) a place provides, e.g. education or health-related
services, etc. [23]
Based on the spatial dimension, a user geo-proﬁle would be
capable of supporting the following queries.
• Which particular places are the user associated with?
Outline the neighbourhoods of the user activity?
• What types of places does the user visit?
The social dimension is compound and comprises two
distinct dimensions: a) social links to other users, and b)
shared content. Explicit links to other users, for example,
as friends or followers, is an orthogonal dimension to both
the spatial and temporal dimensions, where social ties are
formed and maintained between users independently of their
presence in geographic locations. Shared content on social
networks refers to different types of data provided by the users,
for example, text (tags, tips, reviews, tweets, etc.), images
or videos. This dimension is dependent on the spatial and
temporal dimensions, thus particular tags or images are shared
in particular places at speciﬁc time points.
With the spatio-social dimensions, a user geo-proﬁle would
be capable of supporting the following queries.
• Which concepts are the user interested in?
• Where would the user be associated with some speciﬁc
concepts?
• Who does the user share particular interests with?
• Where would the user share an interest in a speciﬁc
concept with another user or group of users?
3instagram.com/developer/endpoints/locations/
The temporal dimension is essentially the time line record-
ing the time stamps of the user’s visits to locations. Frequency
of visits to geographic places can be used as an indicator of
the degree of association with the place, or with the related
activities and concepts. A mapping of the time line can be
made to cluster speciﬁc temporal intervals and study emerging
patterns of user activity, e.g. daily patterns (mornings, after-
noon, evenings and night), weekends and weekdays, seasons,
etc.
With the spatial-social-temporal composite space, a user
geo-proﬁle would be capable of supporting the following
queries.
• When did the user visit a place? How often? How much
time did he spend there?
• Where would the user be on (weekday mornings)?
• Which concept/activity is of interest to the user at a
particular time point?
• Which other users/friends is this user normally with on
(weekends)?
• Where does the user practice a certain activity with
(friends) on (weekday evenings)?
In addition to patterns of presence in a place, a user geo-
proﬁle can also be used to detect patterns of absence from
places.
• When is the user normally absent from a particular place
during the week?
B. Modelling Levels of Threat to Location Privacy
One aspect of user content awareness is related to “Social
privacy”, which concerns how an individual manages self-
disclosures, availability, and access to information about them-
selves by other people when using social-driven applications
[2]. To manage social privacy, one needs to understand the
level of threat implied by his information disclosure and be
able to relate it to the scope of visibility granted for this
information. Here, a possible model is proposed of the levels
of privacy threats with respect to the user geo-proﬁle.
To model the threat level to location privacy on GeoSNs, we
propose mapping to appropriate threat levels based potential
privacy risks resulted from linking between data visibility and
disclosed dimensions. The model assumes that there are three
levels of visibility: private (no access to other people), friends
(access only to friends) and public (access to others whether
inside or outside the social network). It also takes into account
three abstract levels of threat to convey the risk associated
with disclosing personal information: green (safe to disclose
the information; the disclosed information is discrete and in
line with visibility granted), amber (caution; disclosing the
information can result in particular associations extracted and
revealed beyond visibility granted), and red (danger; disclosing
the information can result in implicit patterns extracted and
revealed beyond visibility granted). Considering the potential
value of the information disclosed and the scope of visibility
granted by the user, we introduce a possible mapping of threat
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TABLE I. A possible mapping of privacy threat levels against the
dimensions of data in a geo-proﬁle.
Dimension VisibilityPrivate Friends Public
Spatial green green amber
Social green green amber
Spatial-Social green amber amber
Spatial-Social-Temporal green red red
levels against the dimensions and visibility of data in a geo-
proﬁle as demonstrated in Table I.
Depending on the visibility scope, the threat level is in-
creased as multiple dimensions are considered simultaneously
(allowing links and patterns between data elements to be
inferred). For instance, as the user gives explicit consent of
visibility to the Friends group, access to data on the individual
dimensions; spatial and social axes, are assumed to be granted
(green), where as the threat level increases with the likelihood
of disclosure of implicit data along composite dimensions.
Note that using the dimensions in Table I gives only an
abstract model of the level of threats associated with those
dimensions. Finer speciﬁcation of the data elements, and
relationships between data elements, shared or inferred, along
those dimensions is possible and would give more insight to
the threat levels inherent within the information space of a
geo-proﬁle.
C. Feedback Design for Location Awareness
To enable user content awareness in geo-social networks,
privacy-enhancing feedback and control tools need to be de-
signed and incorporated within the services. The development
of such tools need to consider two requirements, a) Which
content needs to be communicated to the user?, and b) how
(and when) should the content be communicated to the user
to satisfy (and enhance) their privacy awareness?
The ﬁrst question involves considering the communication
of three aspects related to a geo-proﬁle. These are as follows.
1) Data content, both captured or constructed. Ultimately,
a view of the whole geo-proﬁle data space is possible,
including historical data stored and inferred.
2) Visibility (or accessibility) of the geo-proﬁle content to
other users. The user needs to be able to know which
other users in the network are able to gain access to their
data, which types and how much volume of the data are
visible.
3) Estimated threat level associated with the geo-proﬁle.
An indication of the link between content and visibility
can be summarised as a degree of threat to user privacy.
Some default estimation mechanism can be used to
determine the levels of threat, such as the one described
above, but this can be customized by the user, who may
be able to indicate more accurately their perception of
the value of their own data sets.
The second question is related to the usability of the design
used for the feedback and control tools. Several research works
(a) (b)
Fig. 1. A potential design of the privacy-enhancing feedback and control
tool showing the (a) icon design, (b) content of the privacy notiﬁcation tool.
have considered this issue and proposed design principles
and frameworks for building privacy-friendly systems [24],
[25], [26], [27], and highlighted important pitfalls [28] that
privacy designers should avoid. In particular, content provided
in location-awareness feedback tools need to be: a) relevant:
so the user is able to recognize the relevance of the presented
information to their location-sharing activity, b) transparent:
with respect to system reasoning with the user data, c) timely:
feedback should be presented at the point it is needed, d)
actionable: so that the user can respond to the feedback
with appropriate actions and e) comprehensible: so the user
can make accurate interpretation of all elements of feedback
provided.
As an application of the above design ideas, consider the
possible design of a feedback tool for location awareness.
Immediate feedback on location exposure consequences is
assumed, where the system is able to use captured location
information (where the user is at the present time) to project
a report on privacy implications based on registering this
location in the user geo-proﬁle.
One possible design is shown in Figure 1(a). The ﬁgure
shows an icon design for the feedback tool in the form of a
location pin with a lock as an indicator for privacy threat. The
colour of the icon is used to reﬂect the level of threat estimated
by the system. The icon allows the user to explore their content
to understand the basis for the threat indicated. This can be in
the form of a concise pop-up window, as shown in Figure 1(b)
that includes: a) a summary of the current location status, b)
visibility permissions granted, c) a view of the geo-proﬁle that
lists possible constructed information based on this location.
Note that this example is only given to illustrate a form of
realisation of a feedback tool and will be used as a basis to
measure some aspects of location awareness in the experiment
described below. A more dedicated study of design issues is
needed, but is out of the scope of this work.
It is assumed that the application stores a basic user lo-
cation proﬁle that records their spatiotemporal track of place
visit and related contextual data, and that the application is
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Fig. 2. Components of the Location Privacy Awareness Tool.
also capable of deriving implicit information from this data,
including for example, the strength of the user relationship
to speciﬁc places, and his visit patterns to different places.
Figure 2 is an overview of the envisaged privacy awareness
system and its components. The system essentially comprises
a proﬁle analysis unit that dynamically analyses the user track
data collected by the application to determine an appropriate
privacy threat level to be displayed on the interface. A privacy
control unit then allows the user to adjust the visibility and
content of their stored data.
IV. EXPERIMENT
This experiment is designed to evaluate the relationship
between the location awareness model presented and users’
privacy perception and behaviour on GeoSNs. In particular,
the experiment will aim ﬁrst to explore the impact on a
user’s perception of privacy due to providing privacy feedback
including a) The presenation of the geo-proﬁle content, and
b) the use of a privacy threat level indicator. Secondly, the
experiment will study the impact on a user’s behaviour when
sharing his location data online due to his perception of
privacy, resulting from the introduction of the privacy feedback
with and without offering privacy controls.
A. Method
The Location-Based Social Network (LBSN) Foursquare
was chosen as a platform for this study. It is a fairly popular
LBSN that provides a typical example of GeoSNs, and as
such has been used in several previous studies in the literature
[7], [12]. Using a public GeoSN for evaluation provides more
accurate insights of the general user’s privacy attitude and
bahaviour rather than using restricted location-sharing appli-
cations (e.g.[6], [20], [19]). Foursquare offers place discovery
and recommendation services based on users’ location and
previous visits to places (check-ins). User’s friends have access
to his place proﬁle, and the user is also able to grant access
to other users who visit the same places in his proﬁle.
TABLE II. Summary of the check-in scenarios used.
Privacy level Visibility Inferred information
Amber
(Moderate)
Friends and Twitter Interests
Friends only Interests; Friendship rela-
tion
Green (Safe) Friends only None
Red
(Risky)
Friends, Facebook and
Twitter
Pattern of visit; Place
type; Friendship relation
Friends and Twitter Private place (Home);
Friendship relation
Friends only Pattern of activity; Ab-
sence from (Home); Pre-
dicted next check-in
The experiment took the form of an online user study that
utilises realistic scenarios of using the Foursquare checking-
in application. The scenarios were designed for checking-
into places to cover different patterns of data exposure along
the spatial, social and temporal axes. Feedback is provided
“just-in-time” when needed during task execution. We used
scenarios since we need to capture users’ privacy attitude and
bahaviour when presenting with potenial privacy risks rather
than capturing whether they would check-into the particular
places introduced in the scenarion in the real-life situation.
Hypothetical requests and scenarios are exploited for gaining
generalisable outcomes in considerable location-sharing stud-
ies (e.g. [19], [6], [29] ). On the spatial axis, patterns of
presence as well as absence from places were used and on the
social axis, patterns of co-location with friends as well as of
interest in certain concepts and activities, that may be inferred
as a consequence of visiting the place or sharing a tip in the
place, were used.
Six scenarios were designed based on our proposed threat
level model, as shown in Table II, where in green-level
scenarios, the check-in can be shared only with friends and
just the current spatiotemporal information is revealed, the
check-in can be public in amber-level scenarios and the users’
association with the places,concepts and social ties can be
extracted, and ﬁnally in red-level scenarios, check-ins can
also be public and the disclosed spatial-social data constructs
temporal patterns. The scenarios are presented in two condi-
tions. First, the scenarios are presented with feedback only
and then presented again with actionable controls over the
information disclosed. We opted for within-subjects design
since we were interested in capturing the impact of privacy
awareness with and without controls besides its advantage of
reducing errorvariance associated with individual differences
(e.g. [30], [31]).
Perception of privacy is dependent on the user’s ability
to comprehend the information being disclosed. This study
is not intended to measure comprehension, and thus it was
important to reduce the effect of this variable on the result
of the experiment to ensure its validity. To address this issue,
the scenarios included an initial section that enforced (and
simultaneously checked) the participants’ comprehension, by
repeating the displayed information as a list of statements
and asking the participants to check their correctness in the
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(a) (b)
Fig. 3. A sample of the location privacy awareness notice shown in the (a)
feedback-only scenarios, (b) feedback and control scenarios.
scenario presented. For example, a participant would need to
indicate whether visibility is set to friends only or whether the
place type is displayed, before proceeding with the question-
naire.
B. Procedure
The user study is an online survey with four main sec-
tions. The ﬁrst section collects the participants’ demographics,
captures their experience using social networks, and observes
their location privacy concerns, awareness and behaviour when
using them. This is to allow a comparison to be made of those
variables after the experiment.
The second section is the feedback-only section. Six check-
in scenarios are presented to the user. For example, You are
about to check into “Chimichanga”- a mexican restaurant.
You choose to share this check-in on Twitter account. In every
scenario, two screen-shots are displayed to the participants.
The ﬁrst is the normal Swarm4 check-in screen that presents
the check-in task details and a location privacy icon displayed
on the top left corner. The second screen shows the location
privacy awareness pop-up window that would appear if the
user were to click on the location privacy icon, as presented
in Figure 3(a). The set of questions in this section are designed
to capture the impact of the information on their privacy
awareness and concern, their agreement with the choice of
level threat associated with information and ﬁnally whether
they would modify their check-in in any way if given the
option to do so.
In the third section, the same check-in scenarios are used,
but with the location privacy window now providing control
options as well. Participants were offered the opportunity to
delete any of the information elements presented from their
geo-proﬁle (by modifying the user data in a way that makes
deriving the presented information element is impossible), to
4Swarm is the checking-in application for Foursquare.
change the visibility of the check-in or opt to abort this check-
in all together, as shown in Figure 3(b).
The ﬁnal section examines the participants’ perception with
regards to their personal privacy, their need to be aware of the
contents of their geo-proﬁle and their need to control access
to their data, as a consequence of participating in the study.
Moreover, questions were used to gauge their reaction towards
the location awareness tool proposed and its usability.
Pilot tests were conducted on three research students in the
school and three Amazon Mechanical Turk workers who met
the participation criteria (discussed in next section) in order to
ensure the clarity and coherence of the user study. The tests
provided valuable feedback on the structure and wording of
the survey.
C. Recruitment and Participants
The experiment was conducted in June 2015. Participants
were recruited using Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) and
were conﬁned to those who use the Foursquare/Swarm applica-
tion and check-in frequently (not less than three times a week
on average). This was necessary to enable the participants to
realistically relate themselves to the scenarios presented and
to use their experience with the application when commenting
on privacy implications. The MTurk workers also need to have
95% or more approval rate for at least 500 tasks to be able
to participate to make sure that they provide valid feedback
according to the study instructions.
Of the 363 who entered the study, 25 workers were excluded
with the qualiﬁcation test. We also ensured that a MTurk
worker can only participant once in our study by monitoring
the worker ID. 338 participants undertook the study, completed
it in 23 minutes on average and were compensated $1.5
each. The demographics questions revealed that most of the
participants were young people (mean= 30.29, SD= 6.45), with
slightly more male participants (57%) than female ones (43%).
Furthermore, the majority were from North America (59.2%)
and Asia (34.6%).
V. FINDINGS
Analysis of the survey data and presentation of the re-
sults were achieved using R statistical programming lan-
guage, and SPSS was used for applying Friedman, McNemar-
Bowker, Cochran’s Q and Spearman’s rank correlation tests.
An overview of participants’ social networking experience
and pre-study privacy concerns is presented ﬁrst, followed
by analysis of the results from the check-in scenarios section
and ﬁnally the post-study reﬂection on privacy perception and
evaluation of the location awareness tool.
A. Pre-Study Phase
A pre-study evaluation of the participants’ privacy concerns
on the application was conducted to understand the relation-
ship between their level of experience with the application,
their location sharing behaviour and their privacy concerns.
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Most of the participants were moderate users (check-in several
times per week) (57.6%), while the rest were frequent users
(check-in once or more per day) (42.4%). In addition, most
participants would enable location services on their mobile
devices (52% enable them frequently (always on) and 43%
enable them moderately (when required by an application)).
Accessibility to the user personal data by other users is
a primary privacy concern. This is commonly controlled by
deﬁning visibility of one’s proﬁle in the privacy settings within
the network. ‘Friends’ on Foursquare are granted access to the
full location history and thus can potentially have access to a
complete geo-proﬁle. However, it is interesting to note that
people will accept friendship requests from strangers and in
fact may not be fully aware of their friendship links. This
idea was examined in the questionnaire where participants
were asked if they actually know all of their friends (or would
accept friendships with users whom they do not know), and
revealed that only 31.7% of users know all their friends (44.4%
know most of them, 23.4% know some of them). While 64%
of participants think check-ins can be dangerous, most stated
that they currently feel safe using Swarm (87%). Moreover,
71% of participants thought that the privacy settings provided
were sufﬁcient to protect their privacy, but many (46.15%)
also admitted to not checking their privacy settings for a long
time.
It is interesting to note the seemingly contradicting ﬁndings,
where no evident link can be observed between the extent of
visibility of location data and the sense of risk associated with
disclosure of personal location with privacy concerns (feeling
safe). One possible explanation is that user’s awareness is
related directly to the needs of the task being executed. Thus,
awareness is limited to the location data a user is sharing at
any point in time while using the application and hence his
privacy concerns are also limited to only this part of his data
set. This observation is supported by examining responses to a
question on which aspects of their location history were they
able to recall, where about 47% of were able to recall only
one aspect and 2.7% remember nothing of thier history.
B. Check-in Scenarios Phase
Here the results of the questions from sections II (feedback
only) and III (feedback and control) of the study are presented.
1) Impact of Content on Privacy Perception:
a) Sufﬁciency of The Content Provided: Following every
scenario, two questions were used to gather users’ perception
of the sufﬁciency of the information content provided to
convey privacy risk and the effect of the information on their
privacy concerns. Most of the participants reported that the
tool sufﬁciently indicated the privacy risks associated with the
check-in scenarios, as shown in Figure 4. The agreement was
highest in the red level scenarios, followed by Amber and
green (representing 77%, 68%, and 63% respectively).
The content presented have a clear impact on the partici-
pants’ privacy concern based on the threat level of the check-
in scenario (Friedman Chi-Square = 91.227, p = .000), where
Fig. 4. Measure of effectiveness, grouped by threat level.
Fig. 5. Check-in decision with and without the privacy controls grouped by
the threat level indicator.
participants were mostly concerned about their privacy in the
red level scenarios as expected, followed by Amber and green
(representing 72%, 55%, and 45% respectively). There is also
a positive correlation between the participants’ concern level
with the threat level of the check-in scenario (Spearman rank
correlation = .245, p = .000). Hence, the more threat the
location disclosure poses, the more concerned the participants
are on their privacy.
b) Perception of Threat Level Estimation : A high level
of agreement (> 75% overall) is reported by participants with
the threat level indicator presented in every scenario (green:
80%, Amber: 76%, and red: 71%), whereas on average only
10% think the tool should indicate a different threat level. Of
the 10% who disagreed with the threat level indicated, some
thought that the threat is understated (it should be higher),
as explained in their comments ( “This seems like a fairly
high degree of access to information” and “The application
is proﬁling me and allowing any random person to know
these things about me. That’s extremely scary”), while others
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Fig. 6. Check-in attitude grouped by level of privacy concern.
felt that the privacy setting provided by the application were
enough to neutralise the threat ( “Only my friends will see my
details” and “I am protected by my privacy settings”).
2) Impact of Content on User Behaviour: Figure 5 demon-
strates the effect of content awareness on the attitude of users
to modify their behaviour. On average, over 50% of users
chose to modify their check-in action in some way, whereas
the rest either chose to abort the check-in completely (28%)
or would proceed without making changes (22%).
Scenarios with actionable control options signiﬁcantly im-
pact check-in behaviour (McNemar-Bowker=91.495, p =
.000), where tendency to modify the check-in increased by
14% in the control scenarios (feedback only: 44%, feedback
and control: 58%). In addition, with the control options, users
were less likely to abort the check-in (by 7%), presumably as
they were given more options to modify their information con-
tent. Users were rather conservative when choosing the control
options, with 63% choosing to both remove the inferred
information from their proﬁle and change the visibility of their
check-in, and the remaining group chose to either change the
visibility (25%) or to remove the inferred information (12%).
a) Impact of the Threat Level Indicator on Behaviour
: The threat level presented has a signiﬁcant impact on
the participants’ check-in behaviour (Cochran’s Q=33.566,
p = .000). In particular, participants were equally willing to
apply changes to their check-ins in the red (54%) and Amber
(55%) threat levels, and less so with the green level (34%
). Similarly, aborting a check-in was mostly evident with the
red level scenarios 34%, followed by Amber and green (22%,
and 20% respectively). As would be expected, ‘proceed with
no changes’ option was more evident with the green level
scenarios, followed by Amber and red (representing 47%,
23%, and 12% respectively).
b) Privacy Concern and Behaviour: It is useful to ob-
serve the impact of the level of privacy concern on the
actions participants chose to perform (Cochran’s Q=254.628,
p = .000), as presented in Figure 6. Participants who reported
concern about their privacy were the most willing to modify
their check-in information or to abort the check-in (52% and
38% respectively), followed by the group who were neutral
about the privacy concerns (41% and 30% respectively). Note
that the group who reported no privacy concern were still
willing to modify their check-ins and abort the check-in
Fig. 7. The tool support for decision-making based on the availability of
privacy controls, grouped by threat level.
scenarios (23% and 10% respectively). A positive correlation
was noted between the participants’ level of concern and their
check-in attitude, where higher levels of concern resulted in
an increased tendency towards modifying the check-in infor-
mation or aborting the check-in (Spearman rank correlation=
.405, p = .000).
c) Support in Decision-Making: Here we question how
the participants’ decided to modify their check-in actions
as a response to the feedback and control conditions. Con-
trol scenarios were found to more signiﬁcantly inﬂuence
the decision to take action (McNemar-Bowker Test=19.466,
p = .000), where 41% (compared to 33%) of participants
strongly agree that control scenarios were helpful in decision-
making compared to the feedback condition. The difference
was more pronounced in the red threat level scenarios as
shown in Figure 7.
C. Post-Study Phase
1) Location Awareness and Privacy Concern: The overall
effect of location awareness on privacy concern was measured
in post-scenarios questions (Cronbach’s α = .78 ) and results
are shown in 8. The ﬁgure conﬁrms the assumptions made
at the start of this study, where a signiﬁcant portion of
participants (66%) were not aware of the possible information
content in their geo-proﬁles and (71%) underestimated the
privacy risk associated with their check-in activity. Similarly,
(76%) reported that they are now more concerned about their
location privacy (47% of those were strongly concerned), and
8% were not concerned.
Comparing privacy concern before and after the study
(check-in scenarios with the privacy feedback) , it was clear
that the tool has a signiﬁcant impact on the level of privacy
concern of participants (McNemar-Bowker Test=284.520, p =
.000), where a strong negative correlation between the concern
level before the scenarios was noted (Spearman rank correla-
tion= -.829, p = .000). As a consequence, most participants
(84%) also suggested that the experiment will impact the way
they use Swarm in the future (“will be more cautious”).
2) Usability of The Location Awareness Tool: Finally, the
overall impression of whether participants consider the tool
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Fig. 8. General privacy perception after the check-in scenarios.
Fig. 9. Overall impression of the utility of the location awareness tool.
Fig. 10. Overall evaluation of tool design.
useful was measured (Cronbach’s α = .892 ). Figure 9 gives
a summary of the results. Note in particular, how the results
imply that such a tool (providing location content awareness
and control) can lead to an increased trust in the application
and consequently more frequent use of the application.
Participants were also supportive of the design of the threat
level indicator, in terms of the icon choice and the colour
scheme used and suggested that the design will not interrupt
their use of Swarm, as shown in ﬁgure 10. Comments to an
open-ended question on their views on the tool are in line with
the results (“It looks good and does not disrupt the current
format”, “I think the tool is an innovative idea, especially for
those who are uncertain about the personal data that is being
shared.” and “I really love this tool, and it would make me feel
much safer when using Swarm.”). However, this conclusion
needs to be veriﬁed by realistic experience sampling methods
in the future.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
User’s awareness of the consequences of sharing their
location online is rather limited. The reason is twofold; ﬁrstly,
due to the limitations in our abilities as humans to attend
to and recall information that are not needed directly to
the task at hand, thus we will not seek to recall details of
our spatiotemporal proﬁles when checking-in a place, and
secondly, due to the limited support offered by the social
networks to enable users’ perception of their information
content.
This paper addresses this problem by, a) analysing the scope
of privacy threats on geo-social networks, along the spatial,
temporal and social dimensions of data in geo-proﬁles, b)
proposing the design of feedback tools that project a view
of the level of threat associated with the disclosure of location
information, and c) testing the implication of presenting the
feedback on users’ perception of privacy concerns and their
attitude towards sharing their location data on social networks.
Findings from the user study conducted are summarised in
the form of recommendations for the design of more effective
privacy-sensitive geo-social networks. Future work will look
further into the design aspects of the proposed feedback and
control tools, in particular, the scope of information to be
revealed and its timing with respect to task performance, and
will seek in-depth evaluation of the usability aspects of the
design.
REFERENCES
[1] F. Alrayes and A. Abdelmoty, “Privacy concerns due to location sharing
on geo-social networks,” International Journal On Advances in Secu-
rityl, vol. 7, no. 3 and 4, pp. 62–75, 2014.
[2] E. Rader, “Awareness of behavioral tracking and information privacy
concern in facebook and google,” in Proc. of Symposium on Usable
Privacy and Security (SOUPS), Menlo Park, CA, USA, 2014.
[3] D. Fisher, L. Dorner, and D. Wagner, “Short paper: location privacy: user
behavior in the ﬁeld,” in Proceedings of the second ACM workshop on
Security and privacy in smartphones and mobile devices. ACM, 2012,
pp. 51–56.
[4] I. Liccardi, J. Pato, D. J. Weitzner, H. Abelson, and D. De Roure, “No
technical understanding required: Helping users make informed choices
about access to their personal data,” in Proceedings of the 11th Inter-
national Conference on Mobile and Ubiquitous Systems: Computing,
Networking and Services. ICST (Institute for Computer Sciences,
Social-Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering), 2014, pp.
140–150.
[5] N. Wang, J. Grossklags, and H. Xu, “An online experiment of privacy
authorization dialogues for social applications,” in Proceedings of the
2013 conference on Computer supported cooperative work. ACM,
2013, pp. 261–272.
[6] S. Patil, R. Schlegel, A. Kapadia, and A. J. Lee, “Reﬂection or
action?: how feedback and control affect location sharing decisions,” in
Proceedings of the SIGCHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing
Systems. ACM, 2014, pp. 101–110.
[7] T. Pontes, M. Vasconcelos, J. Almeida, P. Kumaraguru, and V. Almeida,
“We know where you live?: privacy characterization of foursquare
behavior,” in UbiComp ’12 Proceedings of the 2012 ACM Conference
on Ubiquitous Computing, 2012, pp. 898–905.
[8] A. Sadilek, H. Kautz, and J. Bigham, “Finding your friends and
following them to where you are,” in Proceedings of the ﬁfth ACM
international conference on Web Search and Data Mining, WSDM ’12,
2012, pp. 723–732.
[9] H. Gao, J. Tang, and H. Liu, “gSCorr: modeling geo-social correlations
for new check-ins on location-based social networks,” in Proceedings of
the 21st ACM international Conference on Information and Knowledge
Management, CIKM ’12, 2012, pp. 1582–1586.
[10] D. Crandall, L. Backstrom, D. Cosley, S. Suri, D. Huttenlocher, and
J. Kleinberg, “Inferring social ties from geographic coincidences,” in
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States
of America, vol. 107, no. 52, 2010, pp. 22 436–22 441.
[11] D. Dearman and K. Truong, “Identifying the activities supported by
locations with community-authored content,” in Proceedings of the 12th
ACM international conference on Ubiquitous computing, 2010, pp. 23–
32.
113
[12] A. Noulas, S. Scellato, C. Mascolo, and M. Pontil, “An empirical study
of geographic user activity patterns in foursquare,” in ICWSM, 2011, pp.
70–73.
[13] D. Preotiuc-Pietro and T. Cohn, “Mining user behaviours: a study of
check-in patterns in location based social networks,” Web Science, 2013.
[14] Y. Zhong, N. J. Yuan, W. Zhong, F. Zhang, and X. Xie, “You are where
you go: Inferring demographic attributes from location check-ins,” in
Proceedings of the Eighth ACM International Conference on Web Search
and Data Mining. ACM, 2015, pp. 295–304.
[15] D. Malandrino, V. Scarano, and R. Spinelli, “Impact of privacy aware-
ness on attitudes and behaviors online,” SCIENCE, vol. 2, no. 2, pp.
pp–65, 2013.
[16] D. Christin, M. Michalak, and M. Hollick, “Raising user awareness
about privacy threats in participatory sensing applications through graph-
ical warnings,” in Proceedings of International Conference on Advances
in Mobile Computing & Multimedia. ACM, 2013, p. 445.
[17] M. Anwar and P. W. Fong, “A visualization tool for evaluating access
control policies in facebook-style social network systems,” in Proceed-
ings of the 27th Annual ACM Symposium on Applied Computing. ACM,
2012, pp. 1443–1450.
[18] M. Fire, D. Kagan, A. Elishar, and Y. Elovici, “Social privacy protector-
protecting users privacy in social networks,” in SOTICS 2012: Second
International Conference on Social Eco–Informatics, 2012, pp. 46–50.
[19] N. Sadeh, J. Hong, L. Cranor, I. Fette, P. Kelley, M. Prabaker, and J. Rao,
“Understanding and capturing people’s privacy policies in a mobile
social networking application,” Personal and Ubiquitous Computing,
vol. 13, no. 6, pp. 401–412, 2009.
[20] J. Y. Tsai, P. Kelley, P. Drielsma, L. F. Cranor, J. Hong, and N. Sadeh,
“Who’s viewed you?: the impact of feedback in a mobile location-
sharing application,” in Proceedings of the SIGCHI Conference on
Human Factors in Computing Systems. ACM, 2009, pp. 2003–2012.
[21] B. Zhang, M. Wu, H. Kang, E. Go, and S. S. Sundar, “Effects of
security warnings and instant gratiﬁcation cues on attitudes toward
mobile websites,” in Proceedings of the SIGCHI Conference on Human
Factors in Computing Systems. ACM, 2014, pp. 111–114.
[22] M.-E. Maurer, A. De Luca, and S. Kempe, “Using data type based
security alert dialogs to raise online security awareness,” in Proceedings
of the Seventh Symposium on Usable Privacy and Security. ACM, 2011,
p. 2.
[23] A. Alazzawi, A. Abdelmoty, and C. Jones, “What can i do there?
towards the automatic discovery of place-related services and activities,”
International Journal of Geographical Information Science, vol. 26,
no. 2, pp. 345–364, 2012.
[24] V. Bellotti and A. Sellen, “Design for privacy in ubiquitous computing
environments,” in Proceedings of the Third European Conference on
Computer-Supported Cooperative Work 13–17 September 1993, Milan,
Italy ECSCW93. Springer, 1993, pp. 77–92.
[25] M. Langheinrich, “Privacy by designprinciples of privacy-aware ubiq-
uitous systems,” in Ubicomp 2001: Ubiquitous Computing. Springer,
2001, pp. 273–291.
[26] B. Friedman, P. Lin, and J. K. Miller, “Informed consent by design,”
Security and Usability, pp. 495–521, 2005.
[27] A. Adams and M. A. Sasse, “Privacy issues in ubiquitous multimedia
environments: Wake sleeping dogs, or let them lie,” in Proceedings of
INTERACT, vol. 99, 1999, pp. 214–221.
[28] S. Lederer, J. I. Hong, A. K. Dey, and J. A. Landay, “Personal privacy
through understanding and action: ﬁve pitfalls for designers,” Personal
and Ubiquitous Computing, vol. 8, no. 6, pp. 440–454, 2004.
[29] K. P. Tang, J. I. Hong, and D. P. Siewiorek, “Understanding how visual
representations of location feeds affect end-user privacy concerns,”
in Proceedings of the 13th international conference on Ubiquitous
computing. ACM, 2011, pp. 207–216.
[30] R. Balebako, J. Jung, W. Lu, L. F. Cranor, and C. Nguyen, “Little
brothers watching you: Raising awareness of data leaks on smartphones,”
in Proceedings of the Ninth Symposium on Usable Privacy and Security.
ACM, 2013, p. 12.
[31] H. Almuhimedi, F. Schaub, N. Sadeh, I. Adjerid, A. Acquisti, J. Gluck,
L. F. Cranor, and Y. Agarwal, “Your location has been shared 5,398
times!: A ﬁeld study on mobile app privacy nudging,” in Proceedings
of the 33rd Annual ACM Conference on Human Factors in Computing
Systems. ACM, 2015, pp. 787–796.
114
